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Abstract—Several IoT applications are tightly dependent on
the locations of the devices. However, localization algorithms can
be easily compromised by injecting false locations. In this paper,
we propose a Blockchain-based secure localization algorithm
for the Internet of Things (IoT). The algorithm uses a public
ledger (Blockchain) that contains nodes position and the list
of their neighbor nodes. This ledger is shared among the IoT
devices. Once an IoT device is localized its new position and
the list of neighbor nodes are added to the Blockchain. This
shared localization data will be used later by other IoT devices
for their localization process. To avoid the attack where a
malicious node sends a fake position, the correctness of the
claimed position are verified before adding it to the Blockchain.
Moreover, data exchanged between nodes (IoT devices) are signed
to guarantee their authenticity and integrity. The integration of
these security mechanisms into the localization process permits
to exclude false data and therefore reduces the localization error.
The simulation results show that adding the proposed security
mechanism improves the localization accuracy of the algorithm
when running in the presence of malicious nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Cisco, fifty billion devices will be deployed
in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) by 2020 [1], [2]. Several types
of devices are connected including smartphones, healthcare
sensor devices, drones and robots [3], [4], vehicles [5], in-
dustrial machines, to name a few. For all these applications,
localization is essential considering that these applications
are typically location-aware. In fact, localization is attracting
interest due to the emerging of context-aware applications in
the IoT [6], [7]. However, to take benefit from localization
services, applications must trust the localization data and make
sure that the positions are not manipulated by malicious nodes.
Therefore, several research works are addressing the problem
of secure localization in the Internet of Things, such as [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12]. In fact, many localization algorithms such
as those based on triangulation [7], or RSSI-based algorithms
[13], [14] are very dependent on the correctness of the location
of nodes participating in the localization algorithm. If any
node provides the wrong location information, the whole
localization system will be compromised. Thus, it is crucially
important to secure the localization algorithm to avoid this
problem for location-aware IoT services and applications.
Related works: Secure localization in IoT is still in its
infancy, and several challenges are still open. Several recent
works have tackled the problem [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. In [8],
the authors addressed the problem of localization of drones
in urban environments, which demands high precision and
accuracy in the selection of waypoints, and presented a novel
solution that is capable of securing the context information for
sharing 3D waypoints between UAVs. The proposed approach
achieves optimal localization through hierarchical context-
aware aspect-oriented Petri nets while being powered by a
new drone context-exchange protocol for security validations.
The wormhole attack has been addressed in [9] and [10].
Paper [9] proposed a label-based secure localization scheme
to detect and defend against wormhole attack. The proposed
work addressed only the wormhole attack, and so it is still
vulnerable to other kinds of attacks. Moreover, the authors
assumed in their network model that there is no packet loss,
which is not realistic in real scenarios.
In [10], the authors proposed a secure localization algorithm
for DV-HOP that establishes the neighbor node relationship
list (NNRL) between nodes to avoid wormhole attack. All the
nodes get the ID numbers of their neighbor nodes through
NNRL. Then, the detection of a suspected node is done by
comparing the theoretical and the actual number of neighbor
nodes. These suspected nodes are eliminated from the local-
ization process.
The Sybil attack, where a malicious node generates several
identities to hide its real identity, was addressed in [12].
The authors proposed Sybil Free APIT (SF-APIT), a secure
localization scheme for hostile distributed wireless sensor
networks that can detect Sybil nodes. The detection mecha-
nism is based on the received signal strength. To prove the
correctness of their idea the APIT [15] localization algorithm
was used as a reference. In [11], the authors proposed the
Secure Location of Things (SLOT) framework to mitigate
the spoofing attack. They reformulate the location estimation
problem as a stochastic censoring model and then proposed
two algorithms to calculate the MLE (Maximum Likelihood
Estimation) for the tags location. The first algorithm is based
on a mixture model and the second on a time-difference-of-
arrival. The authors in [16] replaced all the fixed anchors with
a single drone that flies through a sequence of waypoints.
At each waypoint, the drone acts as an anchor and securely
determines the positions. This approach completely eliminates
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the need for many expensive anchors. They propose three path
planning algorithms that allow a drone to respectively measure
and verify with a guaranteed precision a set of positions in a
secure manner.
Contributions: As compared to previous works on se-
cure localization, in this paper we leverage the use of the
Blockchain technology to prevent attacks that can potentially
compromise the localization algorithms. In fact, Blockchain
is fully decentralized, and the verification of security is per-
formed collaboratively using trusted entities and does not rely
on third parties. All these advantages lead us to design a
new secure localization algorithm for IoT devices. Besides,
the Blockchain technique provides security at two levels of
protocol execution. Indeed, it allows the protection of the
exchanged localization data, and it guarantees the correctness
of the provided localization data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives an overview of the Blockchain technology and its
usage in IoT applications. Then, in Section III, we explain
the possible threat models and attacks. Then, our proposed
secure localization method is presented in Section IV and its
performance evaluation in Section V. Finally, we conclude and
give some future works.
II. THE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND ITS USAGE IN
IOT
In this section, we introduce the Blockchain technology and
its usage in the IoT field.
A. Blockchain Background
The Blockchain technology is a distributed ledger shared
between nodes in a peer-to-peer network. Basically, a ledger
is simply a database that is maintained and updated by every
node in the network.
Each node in the network contains a copy of this ledger.
The security of the Blockchain comes from the fact that blocks
are cryptographically linked in a way that the alteration of one
block requires the modification of all subsequent blocks in the
chain. Moreover, as each node has a copy of the Blockchain,
the attacker needs to make changes in at least 51% of nodes
in order to pass fake information, which makes the attack
extremely much harder.
When a node has data to send (a transaction), it first signs
it and then broadcasts it on the network. Each peer receiving
this transaction first verifies the signature and then forward
the transaction to other nodes in the network. Special nodes
on the network called miners try to packet this transaction
into a new block. For this purpose, first the miners verify the
data, and then, they compute a valid nonce that gives a hash
that satisfies a particular condition (generally that hash begins
with a specific number of zeros). The first miner that found
the required nonce broadcasts this new block on the network
to be added to the Blockchain. To ensure that only valid
blocks are propagated on the network, before re-transmitting
the new block, a node makes extensive verification including
the correctness of the nonce and the hash value and that the
new block is linked to the latest block in the chain (i.e., it
contains the hash value of the latest block in the chain).
Consensus and Proof of Work: In order to guarantee a
specific extension rate (number of blocks added per second),
and to make tampering with a block a difficult task, Blockchain
system introduces a consensus protocol that defines rules for
adding new blocks to the chain. The main used consensus
mechanism is Proof of work (PoW). In the proof of work
consensus protocol a miner needs to find a nonce (a random
number) that produces a hash satisfying certain condition
(generally that the hash is less than a threshold). The task of
finding such nonce is difficult (energy and time consuming);
however, its verification by other nodes is easy. The difficulty
in the PoW mechanism is updated every 2016 new blocks
in such a way to guarantee the desired inclusion rate (in the
Bitcoin network it is fixed to 10 minutes) [17].
B. Blockchain in IoT applications
Blockchain is an emerging technology that is introduced in
many fields especially to provide security and distributed trust
between peer-to-peer nodes. In what follows, we discuss some
works that leveraged the use of Blockchain technology for
the security of IoT applications. Blockchain technology was
integrated into IoT to provide authentication and access control
in [18], [17], [19]. In [18], the authors proposed an access
control mechanism based on Blockchain called FairAccess.
The proposed solution is a fully decentralized pseudonymous
and privacy-preserving authorization management framework
that enables users to own and control their data. To fit their
model, the authors adapted the Blockchain into a decentralized
access control manager, and they used it to store the access
permissions to resources. A Blockchain-based authentication
mechanism for IoT was proposed in [19]. The proposed
solution provides authentication of communicating things and
the integrity of transmitted and stored data through the creation
of secure virtual zone called bubbles of trust. Before any
communication can occur between two nodes of the same
zone, a transaction must be transmitted and validated by
this Blockchain. This rule presents a main weakness of this
solution as it introduces a big latency (depends on the inclusion
rate the Blockchain) in the communicating system.
The authors in [20] proposed a distributed trust manage-
ment scheme for VANET security based on clustering and
Blockchain. Before adding a new block, the scheme requires
the verification of the correctness of the message based on
the vehicle behavior which is controlled by the miner and the
credibility of the message decided by a Cluster Header.
In [21], Dorri et al. addressed the heavy computation load
of the Blockchain technology and provided a lightweight
Blockchain solution for IoT to secure smart home. The pro-
posed solution eliminates the Proof of work and cryptocurren-
cies concepts.
III. THREAT MODEL FOR SECURE LOCALIZATION
Malicious and fake nodes in the IoT positioning system
could intentionally send corrupted or fake information to
disturb the localization system. Several attacks with various
impact target the localization scheme in IoT, including:
• Eavesdropping the devices position: in some localization
systems the position of devices is sent to other nodes.
If this information is sent without encryption, outsider
attacker might eavesdrop the communication and disclose
the IoT device position. This fact breaches the privacy
of the user and makes the confidentiality of the user in
danger [22], [23].
• Message forging: when a node sends its position in the
network, an attacker can intercept the message and forge
it by putting a false position. This behavior could disturb
the whole localization system in the network [24].
• Wormhole attack: In the wormhole attack, two malicious
nodes (called wormhole nodes), strategically placed at
distant regions, collude to create a wormhole link. This
wormhole link can be created using out-of-band or even
wired link. Through this wormhole link the malicious
nodes make victims (called affected nodes), in one region,
believe that they are close to the far apart nodes in
the distant region, which is a deceptive belief to attract
and sniff victims data [25]. The wormhole attack has a
significant impact especially for localization mechanisms
based on RSSI or on the topology the network [9]. Paper
[9] explains the impact of the wormhole attack at the
DV-Hop localization algorithm.
• Sybil attack: In this attack, the malicious node illegiti-
mately presents several addresses to hide its real identity
or to gain more access to the network resources [26].
The Sybil attack has several forms; fabricated identities,
stolen identities, simultaneous and non-simultaneous, etc.
The Sybil attack has a severe impact on the localization
of nodes and might totally disturb the operation of the
network. The impact of this attack on the localization
system was explained in [12].
IV. BLOCKLOC: BLOCKCHAIN LOCALIZATION
ALGORITHM FOR IOT APPLICATIONS
A. System Model and Assumptions
In our application, we consider a set of IoT devices (called
nodes) that collaborate together to determine their position. In
our model, we have the following requirements:
• Decentralization: In our model, there is no central entity
that computes the localization position of nodes: All
nodes are peers that collaborate in the localization system.
• P2P Communications: In our proposed localization
scheme, the IoT devices communicate with its neighbors’
nodes to determine their positions, in a peer-to-peer
network architecture.
• No Central Trust: The proposed network model does not
require a central trusted entity that manages the security
between nodes or detects the existing of malicious nodes.
The trust is provided thanks to the use of the Blockchain
technology.
The aforementioned characteristics of an IoT network model
make the use of a Blockchain a necessity as this latter provides
a secure distributed ledger and can ensure a distributed trust
between the different peers IoT devices. Moreover, a success-
ful security protocol needs to fit the constrained resources
of IoT devices. Indeed, IoT networks generally consist of
heterogeneous devices such as smartphone, watch, wireless
sensor nodes, etc. These later have low computation, low
memory, and low energy power [27]. Therefore, security
protocols need to be lightweight and low-power consuming.
B. The BlockLoc Algorithm
Blockchain is considered as a framework to secure the
data exchanged between a set of peer nodes and to provide
trust between them. In our work, we use Blockchain for two
purposes: (1) first to protect the localization data exchanged
between IoT devices, (2) second to guarantee the correctness
of the given position data.
In what follows, we propose BlockLoc, a secure localiza-
tion scheme that uses the Blockchain technology to protect
the exchanged localization information and to guarantee the
correctness of the claimed node’s position. In the BlockLoc
localization method, nodes collaborate to determine their po-
sition. More precisely, a node needs to communicate with
at least three anchors (i.e., nodes with known positions) in
order to determine its position. Triangulation is an example
of a localization technique that uses at least three anchors
to determine the location of a fourth node. BlockLoc is
algorithm agnostic, which means it can be applied to any
distributed localization algorithms, that is based on location
data exchange. However, instead of sending positions in an
unprotected message that could be forged by attackers, the
node gets the neighbors positions from the secure Blockchain
ledger. This permits avoiding forging attacks. Moreover, a
malicious node can provide a fake position to disturb the
network. To mitigate against this behavior, every claimed node
position is verified before adding it to the Blockchain ledger.
For this purpose, the claimed node is required to send, in
addition to its position, the list of its neighbor nodes. By
verifying that the list of neighbor nodes are really in the
vicinity of the claimed node, the localization scheme can
exclude malicious data.
We assume that each node has two keys: (i.) one key is
public and known by all nodes and (ii.) the other key is kept
private and secret.
IoT applications generally use heterogeneous devices. Some
devices can be equipped with GPS and so can determine their
positions (e.g. smartphone, car, etc.). Other devices might not
be equipped with a GPS, and so they need to run the proposed
secure localization scheme to determine their positions. In
order to work properly, the BlockLoc scheme requires that
a node knows the positions of at least three nodes and the
corresponding distance to them. These nodes will play the
role of anchors. These anchor nodes can be either neighbors
or not. If the anchor node is neighbor, the RSSI technique is
used to estimate the distance between the node and this anchor
  
 
 
 
Nonce 
0x0123… 
Node Identity 
 Position 
 Position Source 
Neighbor List 
Hash=0x0567… 
Nonce 
Previous Hash 
Node Identity 
 Position 
 Position Source 
Neighbor List 
Hash=0x0123… 
Nonce 
0x0567… 
Node Identity 
 Position 
 Position Source 
Neighbor List 
Hash 
Block N Block N-1 Block N+1 
Fig. 1: The BlockLoc BlockChain Structure
[7]. Otherwise, the DV-Hop technique is used [28]. Note that
RSSI stands for Received Signal Strength Indicator and is used
as a link quality estimator in wireless communication [29] and
also used to estimate the distance between two nodes.
The distance between two nodes can be deduced from the
received signal power of nodes using the following equation
[30]:
RSS(d)(dBm) = Ptr−Ploss(d0)−10τ log10
d
d0
+Xσ , (1)
where d means the distance between the transmitting and
receiving nodes, RSS(d) indicates the signal power as received
at a node located across a distance of d from the transmitting
node, d0 is the reference distance, Ptr denotes the transmitted
signal’s power, Ploss(d0) means the signal power loss across the
reference distance d0, τ is the path loss exponent whose value
depends on the medium of propagation, and Xσ is the noise,
which is described as a Gaussian random variable with zero as
its mean and σ as the standard deviation. For more information
about the RSSI and the DV-Hop methods, the reader can refer
to the work [28].
More precisely, the proposed BlockLoc secure localization
scheme works as follows.
1) Initialization: In our network model, we suppose the ex-
istence of fixed anchors with known positions. These anchors
are generally relatively powerful nodes that could play the role
of miners; nodes responsible for adding new blocks to the
Blockchain. Therefore, at the initialization phase, new blocks
containing the anchors’ positions are added to the Blockchain.
These initial anchors’ positions serve in the verification of the
firstly localized nodes’ positions.
2) Blockchain construction: First, each node knowing its
position adds it to the Blockchain. For this purpose, it creates
a block containing; its address, position and the list of neighbor
nodes, then it broadcasts this block to the network. Figure 1,
shows the Blockchain structure.
The message is sent signed. This means that the node
computes a digital signature of the message using its private
key. Other nodes in the network verify the security of the
message by checking this signature using the sender public
key. This guarantee the authenticity (the message is actually
sent by the claimed node) and the integrity (the data has not
been altered during transmission) of the message. Moreover, it
avoids the Sybil attacks and the identity usurpation attacks as
each public key is associated with one address (a node cannot
claim to have different identity). More precisely, the identity
of a node is the hash value of its public key.
When miner nodes receive the new block, they first verify
the message signature using the sender public key. Then, the
miners verify the correctness of the claimed position. This
latter verification consists in verifying that the claimed position
is in the vicinity of the given neighbor nodes. More precisely,
they verify that the distance between the claimed position
and the position of a neighbor node is less or equal to the
value of the communication range. If one of these verification
operations fails, the block is ignored and the node position is
excluded from the localization system. In case both verification
operations succeed, miner nodes compete to find the good
nonce (the nonce that satisfies the required PoW consensus).
The first miner that computes the required nonce broadcast the
new block to the network. The new block contains in addition
to the received data (node address, position and neighbor list)
a hash code and a copy of the hash code of the last block in
the chain (this permit to link blocks between them).
3) Node Localization: In most existing localization
schemes, the localization is based on the existence of anchor
nodes. More precisely, a node with unknown location (we
call it unknown node) needs to have a connection to at least
three anchor nodes in order to be localized. The lack of
enough anchors nodes leads to the failure of the unknown node
localization. To avoid this limit, In the proposed BlockLoc
secure localization scheme, an unknown node can serve by
the already localized nodes.
This permits the localization of the node even without the
availability of fixed anchor nodes. Although it can exist several
localized nodes, the unknown node prioritizes the closest
ones. For this purpose, the unknown node first collects 1-hop
neighbor positions (1-hop neighbor are the nodes that are one
hop far from the unknown node). If it does not get at least
three neighbor’s responses, it makes a new round and contact
2-hop neighbor nodes and so on, the number of neighbor hops
will be incremented at each new round until receiving at least
three responses. More precisely, when a node A wishes to be
localized, first it sends a discover-message to its neighbors
with hopcount value equal to 1. The hopcount field permits
to decide the number of hops the message is traveling in the
network. Each neighbor node receiving this message and that
is already localized, responds by sending a message containing
its identity. By receiving this response message the node A,
first extracts the corresponding neighbor position from the
Blockchain. Then, the node A computes the distance to this
neighbor node using the RSSI method. The RSSI method
is used as the neighbor is a one-hop neighbor. If the node
A receives at least three responses from three neighbors, it
estimates its positions using the Triangulation method [31].
Otherwise, the node A starts a new round and sends a new
discover-message with hopcount value equal to 2. This process
of incrementing the hopcount value is repeated until the node
A receives at least three responses from already localized
nodes. When the responder node is a one-hop neighbor to the
node A the RSSI method is used; However, when the node is
not directly connected to the node A, the RSSI method cannot
be used and so the DV-Hop method is used. The idea of the
DV-Hop message is to first compute the average hop-distance,
then the estimated distance will be equal to the average hop
distance multiplied by the number of hops [28].
As it can be noticed, in our proposed localization method,
the nodes’ positions are not sent in the network. Instead, the
identities of nodes are sent along with their positions are
extracted from the Blockchain. This characteristic permits to
avoid the eavesdropping attack and preserve the privacy of the
users.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the performance of the proposed
secure localization scheme and the impact of the security
improvement on the accuracy of the localization scheme
under the presence of malicious nodes. In the BlockLoc
proposed method, the security mechanism is based on the
use of the Blockchain. To highlight the impact of this se-
curity mechanism, we have implemented two versions of the
localization method. One version without any security scheme
(called HDLoc for Hybrid DV-Hop Localization, which is a
previously published improvement of the DV-Hop algorithm)
and the second version with BlockLoc security mechanism
(called SecHDLoc for Secure Hybrid DV-Hop Localization).
Furthermore, we have considered malicious nodes, and we
tested the impact of these nodes on the performance of the
localization scheme. The malicious behavior that we take into
consideration is the modification of nodes’ positions. More
precisely, the malicious node sends a modified value of its
position. In our simulation, we introduce an error value of
50% which means that:
Malicious position= 1.5 x real position, (2)
A. Simulation Model
In our simulation, we have used a wireless sensor network
consisting of a fixed number of sensor nodes being 100. These
nodes were randomly deployed in an area of 100x100m2. We
assume that all the nodes in the network have the same charac-
teristics. We also assume symmetric links among neighboring
nodes, i.e., if node Ai can receive a packet transmitted by A j,
then vice versa is also true. We used Matlab for implementing
our simulations. The communication range between nodes
is fixed to 30 m. During these simulations, the number of
malicious nodes vary in (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%). For
each simulation scenario, we repeat the experiment ten times
with new randomly generated nodes locations.
B. Simulation Results
Figure 2 shows the impact of the increase of the number of
malicious nodes on the localization accuracy. More precisely,
we have considered two scenarios. In the first scenario, the
anchor rate is equal to 20%, and in the second scenario, the
anchor rate is equal to 50%. In a real scenario, the anchors
are simply IoT devices with a fixed GPS location.
In Figure 2a, where the number of anchor rate is 20%, we
notice that the secure version of the localization algorithm
(SecHDLoc) is slightly affected by the number of malicious
nodes. This is due to the fact that malicious nodes are detected
and eliminated from the localization process. However, as it
can be seen in Figure 2a, the basic version of the algorithm
(HDLoc) is sharply is affected by the number of malicious
node and the localization error reached almost 16m when the
number of malicious nodes is 50%, whereas it is only 4m in
the secure version.
The increase of the anchor rate, Figure 2b, improves the
accuracy of the secure version of the algorithm, however, it
decreases the accuracy of the insecure version of the algorithm.
This can be explained by the fact that the increase of anchor
rate also increase malicious anchor rate (as malicious node
are taken randomly and can be an anchor rate), and the error
introduced by an anchor node has more impact than the error
introduced by other nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a secure localization scheme
based on Blockchain. The proposed algorithm takes advan-
tage of the distributed and the decentralized characteristic of
Blockchain to provide a trustful framework of information
sharing between nodes. Thanks to Blockchain, a malicious
node cannot inject fake data to the localization mechanism
as all data need to be verified and checked before adding it
to the Blockchain. The performance evaluation demonstrates
the improvements of the security mechanisms on the accuracy
of the localization algorithm under the presence of malicious
nodes. More precisely, the introduced security mechanisms
minimize the localization error to the 1/4 as compared to the
non-secure version under the presence of 50% of malicious
nodes. As future work, we will implement the proposed secure
localization scheme on a real platform using Raspberry Pi
devices.
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